Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy

We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a v...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Link(s) zu Dokument(en):IHS Publikation
Hauptverfasser: Sausgruber, Rupert, Sonntag, Axel, Tyran, Jean-Robert
Format: Discussion/ Working Paper NonPeerReviewed
Veröffentlicht: 2019
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.