Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games

This paper provides a novel existence theorem for subgame perfect equilibria of potentially large extensive form games with perfect information and continuous preferences, allowing for infinite horizon and infinite action spaces. The approach is based on the properties of the topology on the space o...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Link(s) zu Dokument(en):IHS Publikation
Hauptverfasser: Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, Ritzberger, Klaus
Format: Article in Academic Journal PeerReviewed
Veröffentlicht: Elsevier 2016
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:This paper provides a novel existence theorem for subgame perfect equilibria of potentially large extensive form games with perfect information and continuous preferences, allowing for infinite horizon and infinite action spaces. The approach is based on the properties of the topology on the space of outcomes and differs from all previous approaches in the literature. Furthermore, the existence proof relies on a new algorithm that is independent of the horizon, hence can also be applied to infinite-horizon games. (author's abstract)