Voluntary Contributions to a Public Good When Partial Contribution is a Dominant Strategy
Abstract: We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a dominant strategy solution in the interior of the strategy space. In the experiment we observe significant over-contribution. This result is similar to those of the typical corner solution experiments.;| Link(s) zu Dokument(en): | IHS Publikation |
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | IHS Series NonPeerReviewed |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Institut für Höhere Studien
1995
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| Zusammenfassung: | Abstract: We present an experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good. The game has a dominant strategy solution in the interior of the strategy space. In the experiment we observe significant over-contribution. This result is similar to those of the typical corner solution experiments.; |
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