A model for a multi-country, fiscal decision-game

The motivation for the proposed game stems from the deficiencies and shortcomings of traditional management decision games. the latter simulate but one market, viz., the market for consumer-goods, and neglect - to name just the most important - the capital-goods market, the labour market, and the mo...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Link(s) zu Dokument(en):IHS Publikation
Hauptverfasser: Grafendorfer, Walter, Seidl, Christine, Topritzhofer, Edgar
Format: IHS Series NonPeerReviewed
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: institut fuer hoehere studien 1970
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:The motivation for the proposed game stems from the deficiencies and shortcomings of traditional management decision games. the latter simulate but one market, viz., the market for consumer-goods, and neglect - to name just the most important - the capital-goods market, the labour market, and the money market. moreover, economic policy does not appear as a deliberate governmental strategy for the implementation of macro-economic goals, but is, if at all, represented only by some ta-parameters which are more or less arbitrary fixed by the game direction. for both of these reasons, viz., the neglection of economic interdependence on the one hand and the omission of the government as an independent decision maker on the other hand, we doubt whether the traditional management games provide a realistic setting for the simulation of entrepreneurial decision making. apart from these objections we felt that the representation of governments by individual groups of players would offer the additional advantage of permitting the simulation of decision making not only in the field of management but also in the sphere of fiscal and macroeconomic policy, which hitherto has been beyond the scope of traditional decision games. (...);