Unifying EU Representation at the IMF Executive Board: A Voting and Veto Power Analysis
Abstract: The consequences of consolidating EU representation at the IMF Executive Board by regrouping the 27 Member States into two EU constituencies, euro area and non-euro area, are discussed. In particular we contrast voting power as proposed byPenrose-Banzhaf (PBI) and Shapley-Shubik (SSI), and...| Link(s) zu Dokument(en): | IHS Publikation |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | IHS Series NonPeerReviewed |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Institut für Höhere Studien
2009
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| Zusammenfassung: | Abstract: The consequences of consolidating EU representation at the IMF Executive Board by regrouping the 27 Member States into two EU constituencies, euro area and non-euro area, are discussed. In particular we contrast voting power as proposed byPenrose-Banzhaf (PBI) and Shapley-Shubik (SSI), and other respectively related measures of blocking (or veto) power and decision efficiency as proposed by Coleman and Paterson. Hitherto, IMF-specific literature is PBI-based. However, theoretical reasons and empirical plausibility arguments for the SSI are compelling. The (SSI) voting power of the two large constituencies - U.S.A. and euro area - reflects their corresponding voting shares over a range of majority thresholds, whereas PBI voting power reduces to only half of vote share at the majority threshold of 85% needed for some Executive Board decisions. SSI-related estimates of veto power are generally lower than the Coleman indices. Correspondingly, the efficiency of collective decision-making is considerably underestimated by the Coleman measure.; |
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