The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems
Abstract: While the interventionist state was characterised by a high level of centralisation in administration and policy making , the regulatory state relies on extensive delegation of powers to independent institutions: regulatory agencies or commissions, but also the judiciary, which is becoming...| Link(s) zu Dokument(en): | IHS Publikation |
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| Format: | IHS Series NonPeerReviewed |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
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Institut für Höhere Studien
1998
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| Zusammenfassung: | Abstract: While the interventionist state was characterised by a high level of centralisation in administration and policy making , the regulatory state relies on extensive delegation of powers to independent institutions: regulatory agencies or commissions, but also the judiciary, which is becoming an increasingly active player in the regulatory game. Delegation of important policy-making powers to non-majoritarian institutions raises novel problems of democratic legitimacy. This paper argues that such problems should be tackled not by limiting the independence of the regulators, but by strengthening the accountability structure. Similar problems arise at the European level. Here, too, the correct solution is a better accountability structure rather than increased politicisation. The de-politicisation of European policy-making is a consequence of the fact that the large majority of Europe's voters support far-reaching economic integration but oppose true political integration.; |
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