Siblings, Strangers, and the Surge of Altruism
Abstract: We demonstrate how altruism can surge in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling, or with a stranger, and that the probability that an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff...| Link(s) zu Dokument(en): | IHS Publikation |
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| Format: | IHS Series NonPeerReviewed |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
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Institut für Höhere Studien
1999
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| Zusammenfassung: | Abstract: We demonstrate how altruism can surge in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling, or with a stranger, and that the probability that an individual survives to reproduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of nonparents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the unique and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.; |
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