Strategic pricing, signalling, and costly information acquisition
Consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers. Upon observing the price, buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases. Under a belief-restriction, which generalizes the idea of the C...| Link(s) zu Dokument(en): | IHS Publikation |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Article in Academic Journal PeerReviewed |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2001
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| Zusammenfassung: | Consider a market where an informed monopolist sets the price for a good or asset with a value unknown to potential buyers. Upon observing the price, buyers may pay some cost for information about the value before deciding on purchases. Under a belief-restriction, which generalizes the idea of the Cho–Kreps ‘intuitive criterion’, we establish a version of the Grossman–Stiglitz Paradox: there is no separating equilibrium with fully revealing prices. Yet, we also resolve the paradox. There is a unique equilibrium, and as the cost of information becomes small, the equilibrium approaches the full information outcome and prices become perfectly revealing. (author's abstract) |
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